EVALUATION OF NIGERIAN PORTS POST-CONCESSION PERFORMANCE
Concession has been acknowledged as a valuable tool for port authorities to retain control of ports and shape the supply side of the terminal market, in the absence of full privatisation. This study empirically examines the influence of transfer of port operational services from the public to the private sector, through concession contracts on operational performance in the context of the Nigerian port industry. It extends the work of Liu (1995) and others on the comparative performance of public and private ports in the UK and other countries, by extending the study to the Nigerian ports concessions.
The Nigerian port reform was borne out of the belief that the transfer of port operations from the public to the private sector will improve the efficiency of the ports, by instigating competition among the various terminal operators. The Nigerian port concession involved the delineation of six Nigerian ports into 25 terminals and awarded to terminal operators. The objectives of the study include, among others; the benchmarking of pre- and post-concession efficiency, to determine sources of efficiency change and to determine factors responsible for the improvement of Nigerian port performance.
A positivist approach is adopted, using quantitative data that involves outputs and inputs related to the port‘s production function. Theoretical underpinnings of privatisation and performance, as well as empirical evidence from countries, were presented and discussed. The variables of the research were analysed using non-parametric DEA and the Malmquist Productivity Index to determine the efficiency and the sources of productivity change respectively. This study introduced a novel idea, by adopting a concentration index in measuring the level of competitiveness of ports. The conceptualised theoretical model of operational performance was solved using a two-stage multivariate regression, to determine the factors responsible for the improvement of the Nigerian ports‘ efficiency.
The results of the analysis suggested that the productive performance of the ports under consideration improved after the transfer of terminal operations to the private sector, though not in all the ports. Indicating that the wholesale concession of the ports is not the best after all, some ports would have been better left under public ownership. The driver of the improved efficiency after concession, is scale efficiency (increased throughput levels), rather than technical efficiency. Therefore, the post-concession Nigerian ports performance is influenced by the scale of production and change of ownership. The delineation of the ports into terminals has not ushered in the expected competition among and within the ports.
Table of Contents
Copyright statement i
Conference papers ii
Table of Contents v
List of Figures xii
List of Tables xv
List of Abbreviations xvii
Chapter One : Introduction 1
Background to the Research1
Statement of the Problem3
Research Aim and Objectives5
Significance of the Study6
An Overview of the Nigerian Economy and Seaports7
Yearly Traffic Pattern and Trends of Nigerian Seaports14
Organisation of Thesis16
Chapter Two : Review of Theories, Concepts and Literature 18
The Concept of Port Services18
Economic characteristics of port service24
Public versus private goods characteristics24
Perfect competition and natural monopoly26
Conceptual Framework for Classifying Port Ownership and Administrative Models28
Concession agreement as an instrument of port privatisation35
Justification for port privatisation36
Survey of Global Port Ownership, Privatisation and Administrative Structure38
Port ownership and administrative models in Africa44
Port ownership and administrative model in Nigeria49
Administrative structure of the NPA51
Port Reform in Nigeria54
The concession structure57
The concession process59
Implementation of the concession programme60
Perception of Port Users to the Concession Programme68
Determinants of Port Operational Performance72
Port market and intra-port competition78
Why Regulate a Privatised Port?81
Relationship between Port Privatisation, Competition and Performance82
Ownership and efficiency85
Efficiency and port size86
Chapter Three : Literature Reviews on Performance Measurement 89
Port Performance Metrics and Productivity Measures89
Port financial performance metrics90
Partial indicators/snapshot measures91
Single and partial productivity indexes92
Total factor productivity measures94
TFP estimation techniques96
Productivity change over time (Malmquist productivity indexes (MPI) Concept)97
MPI applications in the port industry99
Applications of SFA in the port industry106
Introduction to DEA technique108
Other DEA models110
Problems with DEA application in port efficiency literature112
Chapter Four : Research Design and Methodology 118
An Overview of Methodological Approaches119
Research philosophy (Paradigm)119
The Research Design130
Defining Concepts and Research Design132
Port Performance Measurement Processes134
Analytical benchmarking for port and terminal efficiency134
Productivity change analysis: Total factor productivity (Malmquist Index)135
Operationalisation of Concepts136
Formalising the DEA methodology136
DEA model extensions and returns to scale141
Malmquist productivity index decomposition145
Validation and accuracy159
Data scaling, exclusivity and exhaustiveness160
Positivity and isotonicity property160
Chapter Five : Benchmarking Nigerian ports operational efficiency 164
Analysis and Results164
Intertemporal analysis (2000-2011)164
Influence of production size on port efficiency169
DEA window analysis180
Pre- and Post-concession Efficiency of Nigerian seaports189
Technical efficiency of post-concession Nigerian ports194
Post-concession scale efficiency195
Comparison of pre-and post-concession efficiency199
Productivity Change Analysis of Nigerian Seaports (2000-2011)203
Total factor productivity (TFP) analysis (2000-2011)204
Analysis of pre- and post-concession efficiency change210
Chapter Six : Role of Ownership on Nigerian Ports‘ Performance 217
Port Efficiency and Ownership218
Analysis of the relationship between efficiency scores and ownership types219
Temporal changes in Nigerian seaports productivity (MPI) and ownership.222
Measurement of Competition Level224
The market structure of Nigerian ports227
Nigerian ports market share229
Nigerian ports market concentration230
Conceptualization of the theoretical model for operational performance231
Factors Influencing Port Efficiency233
Level of port competition234
Determinants of Throughput234
Result of the Regression Analysis237
First Stage: Port output model237
Second stage OLS: Port efficiency model238
The Impact of Concession on Key Port Performance Indicators240
Chapter Seven : Research Findings, Policy Implication and Conclusions 251
Summary of findings on the influence of ownership change on Nigerian ports performance.
Achievement of Study Objectives258
Contribution to Knowledge261
Limitations of the Research262
Future Research on the Performance of Nigerian Ports264
Appendix 1.1: Literature of DEA Applications in the port sector and the variables used 289
Appendix 1.2: Newspaper Articles on Nigerian Ports Concession 296
Appendix 5.1: Nigerian port level analysis data (2000-2011) 299
Appendix 5.2: Descriptive statistics of input and output variables 302
Appendix 5.3: Descriptive analysis of the variables 305
Appendix 5.4: Port level Inter-temporal Analysis technical efficiency scores, RTS, Actual/Target Input and Output variables 307
Appendix 5.5: Nigerian ports reference peers (benchmarks), Input/output slacks for inefficient port- year operations 310
Appendix 5.6: Port overall (CCR), technical (BCC), scale (SE) and super-efficiency scores and return to scale 313
Appendix 5.7: Nigerian ports DEA-BCC Window efficiency scores (2000-2011) 316
Appendix 5.8: Nigerian ports DEA-CCR Window efficiency scores (2000-2011) 320
Appendix 5.9: Pre-concession DEA-CCR & BCC efficiency scores and returns to scale 323
Appendix 5.10: Post-concession Overall, pure technical, scale efficiency scores and returns to scale
Appendix 6.1: Port-year DEA-efficiency scores of ownership types 327
Appendix 6.2: Comparison of port efficiency score of different ownership styles 328
Appendix 6.3: Bivariate analysis of public and mixed ownership efficiency scores 328
Appendix 6.4: Bivariate analysis of mixed and landlord ownership efficiency scores 329
Appendix 6.5: Ownership and sources of efficiency analysis 329
Appendix 6.6: comparison of change in total factor productivity of public and landlord ports 330
Appendix 6.7: Comparison of technological change of public and landlord ports 330
Appendix 6.8: Comparison of technical efficiency change of public and landlord ports 331
Appendix 6.9: Comparison of scale efficiency change of public and landlord ports 332
Appendix 6.10: Throughput determinants data in Log form 332
Appendix 6.11: First- Stage Regression with throughput Analysis 336
Appendix 6.12: Data on determinants of Nigerian ports efficiency 337
Appendix 6.13: Second-Stage regression efficiency Model 340
Appendix 8.1: Nigerian ports Inter-temporal analysis VRS reference efficiency benchmarks 341
Chapter One: Introduction
Background to the Research
The last decade has witnessed significant changes in the ports in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 31 countries with ports in the sub-region have either improved legislation or policy oversight, restructured, or embraced private participation in an attempt to reform the ports. The ports in the sub-region are gradually moving away from being publicly operated to engaging the private sector in terminal operations through concession contracts. Most container ports have been a concession, while the specialised ports and terminals are either privately owned or leased. International and local companies participate in the operation of a vast number of ports, even in relatively small ports and in competing terminals at more major ports.
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have embraced reforms, as ports play a role in the global trade logistics chain, which impacts heavily on the cost of many exported and imported goods. The belief is that the reforms that improve efficiency will lead to a reduction in total logistics costs. It also impacts positively on the overall competitiveness of economies of reforming countries (Estache, González, & Trujillo, 2001). The most commonly used tool to engage the private sector in the port industry is a concession contract. It is a public–private partnership (PPP) of a contractual nature and has been a favourite means worldwide of instigating port development. It provides new opportunities for injecting private capital, by adopting a market orientation approach. A common feature of reforms is monitoring and evaluation. The focus of ports in post-reform monitoring is partial productivity indicators. The partial indicators, though useful, can be quite misleading, as they do not generate the same ranking for all the ports. As a result, the port authorities have limited information to implement some of the regulatory mechanisms that require consistent estimation of efficiency gains (Trujillo & Nombela, 2000). Hence, the need for a study that reflects the joint effects of all inputs and outputs in the measuring of absolute performance.
Nigeria ports play a significant role in international trade in the sub-region; over 90% of traded goods are carried by sea. The Nigeria economy accounts for over 70% of seaborne trade in the West and Central African sub-region due to its vast population (Fivestar Logistics, 2008). Therefore, assessing the productive efficiency of Nigerian ports after
concession is crucial to the implementation of port reforms of other countries in the sub- region.
Port development in Nigeria has a chequered history. However, the history of modern ports administration can be traced to the Port Act 1954. The Act gave impetus to the establishment of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) in April 1955, as a public corporation. It was owned wholly by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and charged with the responsibility to operate and regulate seaports in Nigeria (Mohammed, 2008). The importance of ports as a catalyst for economic development was recognised in the first national development plan (1962-1968). The plan earmarked Nigerian ports for development; it provided for the expenditure of £45 million for the improvement of facilities at Lagos and Port Harcourt ports (Akinwale & Aremo, 2010). The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) constituted a major setback for port development in Nigeria due to the closure of Port Harcourt port to foreign traffic. Lagos port was left to supply port services in Nigeria. As a result, the then military government enacted a decree empowering the NPA to acquire the private ports in the Eastern part: Warri port operated by John Holt transport, Burutu port owned by United African Company (UAC) and Calabar port by five different operators.
After the end of the Civil War, the ports were characterised by a massive influx of imports (construction equipment and cement) for post-war reconstruction. It resulted in unprecedented levels of congestion at the ports. In addition, the road infrastructure was inadequate and could not cope with expeditious evacuation of cargo. The average ship waiting time before berthing was 180 days and approximately 250 days for Lagos port, resulting in the imposition of surcharges. The government embarked on several emergency measures, such as; the construction of a new port in the Lagos area (Tin Can Island port); and the acquisition of new equipment to increase berth productivity and to ameliorate the problem (Shneerson, 1981). The main consequence of port delay is the rise in freight charge. The increase in freight charge impacted on agricultural exports as they could no longer compete in the international market due to the high cost.
The NPA continued with the responsibility of piloting the affairs of the ports as a public corporation with subsidy from the federal government until the economic downturn of the 1980s. The economic recession of the 1980s affected Nigerian ports, as traffic to the ports declined. In response, the government initiated a process of divesting in public corporations, through either commercialisation or privatisation policies. As a result, the NPA was slated for commercialisation. In 1992, the NPA was commercialised and the name was changed to Nigerian Ports Plc, but the ownership was still in the public domain, as the FGN solely owns it. In 1996, four years after commercialisation, the organisation reverted to its former name, the Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA), as a parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Transport (FMOT). However, the revision did not stop the commercialisation efforts, as the corporation continued to operate as a commercial enterprise (NPA Brand Manual, 2005).
The global changes in the port industry, coupled with the economic downturn of the 80s, triggered infrastructure obsolescence and decay. It became evident that the government had no resources, or the managerial ability, to run a modern port successfully (Razak, 2005). In addition, the trend worldwide was that governments were disengaging from port operations and restricting activities to regulation and providing an enabling environment for the private sector to operate, providing the impetus for change. The option of transfering port operations to the private sector through concession contracts then became imperative. The policymakers realised that maintaining the status quo would lead to further decay of the ports and losing the competitive edge among ports in the sub-region. Therefore, the introduction of the private sector in port operations in Nigeria was embraced, as it has been acknowledged that private operation of ports will encourage greater flexibility, efficiency and better services to port consumers. It brought to the fore the disengagement of government from the activities that could be more efficiently performed by the private sector.
Statement of the Problem
During the 1990s and prior to concession, Nigerian seaports were considered inefficient and unsafe due to massive cargo thefts (wharf rat phenomenon) and among the most expensive ports in the world. Also, the ports in Lagos were notorious for congestion that led to the continuing imposition of congestion surcharges and the high cost of imports, resulting in long turnaround times for ships and increased container dwell times (Leigland & Palsson, 2007). Instead of the international standard of 48 hours ship turnaround time in most Asian and
European ports, as observed by Ducruet and Merk (2012), it took weeks to load and unload ships in Nigeria ports. There were also problems of over bloated workforce, excessive port charges and too many agencies involved in cargo clearing. In addition, the port infrastructure and superstructure had become obsolete and in a state of disrepair and in need of rehabilitation. The government was unwilling to provide the enormous financial outlay required in financing the restoration of port infrastructure due to existing operational inefficiency and corruption, therefore the need for external financing became apparent. In order to mitigate these problems, government decided to introduce the private sector, to bring in expertise in the operation of the ports through concession contracts.
These massive reforms were undertaken in the belief that the reforms that improve operational efficiency of ports are likely to bring down total logistics costs and in turn improve the competitiveness of the Nigerian economy. The most valuable tool for bringing cost-cutting efficiency gains and improvements in the overall performance of the ports is the introduction of some form of competition. Competition can be introduced into the ports through ex-ante or ex-post approaches (Estache, González, & Trujillo, 2002). Ex-ante relies on the auction of rights to operate the port, or in the port while ex-post is competition between ports, or between terminals within the port. The Nigerian port concession is articulated to involve these two types of competition.
As a result, the Nigerian government embarked on the most extensive infrastructure port reforms that have taken place worldwide. It culminated in the handing over of port operations, through concession contracts, in 2006 (Ocean Shipping consultants, 2008; Palsson & Leigland, 2007). The primary objective of the Nigerian ports‘ concession is to attract investment, lower tariffs, improve service delivery to the consumer and in the end improve the overall performance of the ports. However, six years after handing over the operation of Nigerian ports to the private sector, in what is described as the most ambitious port reform that has taken place worldwide, no study has examined the overall impact of the concession to ascertain if the ports are on the path to efficiency. Though there are some studies that have dealt with some aspects of the Nigerian ports‘ concession such as Akinwale and Aremo (2010), which examined concession as a tool to manage the crisis at Nigerian ports. Oghojafor, Kuye, and Alaneme (2012) studied concession as a strategic instrument for
efficiency and Okeudo (2013), looked at the efficiency level of Onne port after the reform. However, all these studies have only employed a piecemeal approach to studying the Nigerian port reform programme and none have evaluated the outcome of the concession programme holistically. That being the case, the research question is: Has the massive reform that took place during a short period improved the performance of Nigerian ports? That is what this study investigates and provides a model for future evaluation. To put it succinctly, the study investigated the underpinning questions: ―Does the transfer of the operation of a whole nation‟s ports from the public to the private sector, through concession contracts, have an influence on the performance of the ports?
Focusing on the Nigerian port sector, the study examines the relationship between privatisation through concession contracts and performance. The study focused on 20 concessions for six Nigerian ports (Apapa, Calabar, Onne, PH, TCIP and Warri), which are representative of port infrastructure concessions in 2006. On average, these concessions have been in operation for 6 years.
The research concentrated on investigating these questions:
⦁ Are ports with terminal operations in the hands of the private sector more efficient than those in the public sector?
⦁ Are ports that are under intense intra-port competition more efficient than those that are not?
⦁ What factors influence port operational performance?
⦁ What role does ownership of port institutions play in influencing operational port performance?
Research Aim and Objectives
The aim of this research is to study the port concession programme and its influence on the efficiency of Nigerian seaports, as well as benchmark the operational efficiency of the ports, to determine which operators are making efficient use, of resources allocated to them. In other words, the research examined in-depth, the post-concession operational performance of Nigerian ports to ascertain whether the ports are on the path to efficiency. The study addressed the aim by focusing on these specific objectives:
i. To measure and examine the efficiency trend of Nigerian seaports;
ii. To evaluate pre- and post-concession Nigerian ports‘ efficiency;
iii. To examine the overall performance of Nigerian ports from productivity and efficiency change perspectives;
iv. To determine the competitiveness of Nigerian seaports after concession;
v. To determine the factors that influence Nigerian ports‘ operational performance;
vi. To assess the impact and port users‘ perspective on the concession programme;
Significance of the Study
The result of this study is significant and can have some important policy implications. Nigeria is a major force in international trade, with 70% of goods coming to the West, and Central Africa destined to Nigeria. Out of which 80% of the traded goods are transported by sea (UNCTAD, 2009). Therefore, the study of port performance is crucial to the sub-region. The World Bank African infrastructure country diagnostics (2008) assessment of ports in Sub-Saharan Africa ranked Nigeria as the top reformer Vagliasindi and Nellis (2009). The PPI database put the total private sector investment in Sub-Saharan African ports at $1.3 billion, with 62 percent related to the container terminals and 32 percent to multipurpose terminals, with little in the bulk cargo facilities. Nigeria accounts for 55 percent of the total private sector investment in the sub-region and the biggest single deal is the container terminal Apapa in Lagos, Nigeria, which attracted over $300 million. These transactions further attracted $1.7 billion in royalties to governments in the sub-region with over $1billion associated with the Apapa terminal concession (Ocean Shipping consultants, 2008). Also, Nigeria is the only country to concession all her ports in one scoop and the pace of concession (20 concessions within a year) is unprecedented worldwide (Ocean Shipping consultants, 2008). Therefore, it becomes imperative to study the outcome of the programme that attracted such huge investment in the sub-region. The study will also be crucial for governments in the sub-region seeking to embrace port concession, to learn from the successes and mistakes of Nigeria. Globally, the study of the Nigerian ports concession is a good example to demonstrate the effects of national port concessions on port performance.
Although the number of studies measuring ports performance is flourishing, several gaps still exist. For instance, a review of the studies in port economics, policy and management conducted by Pallis, Vitsounis, and De Langen (2010) discovered a total of 395 published journal papers between 1997-2008. A breakdown of the 395 publications by continent revealed that 266 belong to European ports, 99 to North America, 87 to Asia, 20 to Oceania, and 14 to South America, while Africa has only 3. The review indicates that the studies are lopsided in favour of the developed world. It is commonly acknowledged in global network inclusive logic, that ―a chain is as strong as the weakest link‖. As each country‘s individual port performance will affect the functioning of the chains that make-up the logistic network directly. Therefore, the need to study the outcome of the reform programmes that are targeted to improve the country‘s performance and overall competitiveness of its ports cannot be overemphasised.
In addition, there are many studies on seaport efficiency measurement, as evident from the surveys of DEA studies by Panayides, Maxoulis, Wang, and Ng (2009); González and Trujillo (2009) and a synthesis by Wang, Song, and Cullinane (2002). The surveys analysed over 26 journal papers on efficiency measurement from 1993-2006. It could be argued that to increase the efficiency of ports, the results of other research can be applied directly. However, as observed by Hall (2002), studies from different countries are hardly comparable, due to the timeframe, entities, the structure of ports, or the countries‘ social systems differ. However, there are no port efficiency studies devoted solely to productive efficiency, or the effect of privatisation on the operational performance of the Nigerian seaports, despite its strategic position trade-wise, in the sub-region. Hence, the motivation for this study to fill this identified gap. It makes the study crucial to all maritime players.
An Overview of the Nigerian Economy and Seaports
Nigeria occupies an area of 923,768 sq. KMs and is one of the largest countries in Africa. It is located on the west coast of Africa, bordering Benin, Niger and Cameroon. The country has a rich maritime history and a coastline of 850km which is littered with natural harbours and sandy beaches. Nearly 170m people live in Nigeria, making it the most populous nation in Africa and the 7th largest in the World. It has a GDP per capita of $3010.3 and a GDP of
$522.6 billion and an annual GDP growth rate of 7.3% in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). The UN
forecast that by 2050, the Nigerian population will reach 289 million following only India, China, the USA and Pakistan in global population ranking. Lagos is the second largest city in Africa (after Cairo) with a population of 10.2 million and 60% of Nigeria manufacturing is located in Lagos. The economy is the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, having just overtaken South Africa; the economy grew by 7.69% and 6.5% in 2011 and 2012 respectively
Nigeria‘s biggest export is crude oil, and the country‘s economy is supported by the revenue it generates. Oil accounts for 80% of the country‘s domestic product. Prior to the discovery of petroleum, agriculture used to be the mainstay of the nation‘s economy. As the revenue from oil increased, agriculture was neglected. As a result, food production could not keep pace with the expanding population and Nigeria has to import food to supplement local production. Nigeria also imports refined petroleum products despite being the 11th largest oil producer in the world (2,682,000 bbl/day as at 2012). This is due to inefficiency and unreliability of the three big refineries refineries, coupled with economic sabotage in the form of petroleum product vandalisation.
Nigeria is a major advocate of healthy sub-regional ties and trade, after the formation of the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) in 1975. Nigeria maintains non- discriminatory foreign trade relations with all the five continents of the world as a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It has entered into many bilateral trade agreements with various countries. Nigeria‘s principal trading partners include Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the USA. There also exists a thriving trade between Nigeria and her neighbouring countries in the west and central African sub-region, while concerted efforts are being made to reach out to southern Africa and the rest of the world.
Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS and with the introduction of a single passport and a single market, subsequently other barriers that limited the flow of goods, services and capital flow between Nigeria and her neighbours, have disappeared. The removal of these barriers, made it impossible for ports in other West African countries previously to load/unload Nigeria cargo by sea, ushered in competition among the ports in the sub-region. This meant the decision and choice variables to use any of these ports Apapa port in Lagos, Cotonou Port in Benin, Lome Port in Togo or Tema Port in Ghana is total cost, speed and reliability of transport. Consequently, Nigerian ports began to lose cargo, because many shippers responded to these scenarios by diverting their containers to other countries for transhipment
to Nigeria in smaller vessels. Nigeria‘s loss has become its more competitive neighbouring ports‘ gain.
As the drift of cargo meant for Nigerian ports continued unabated to ports in neighbouring countries, the government came up with a more radical approach to public sector reform in Nigeria. The main thrust of the new approach is a shift from commercialisation to transfer of operational activities of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), from the public to the private sector, through partial or outright privatisation. For the port industry, the primary goals of this reform were to increase competitiveness and efficiency of national ports. In order to achieve these goals, the government defended an increase of private participation in port management. Nigerian ports moved from a tool port model, where the public sector holds the infrastructure and superstructure, to a landlord port model (Kieran, 2005). In this model, the port authority retains the infrastructure ownership, but private operators provide the services through a licence or concession (Brooks, 2004). The operators are responsible for hiring workers and for investing in equipment and superstructure. The port authority is responsible for the construction and management of infrastructures associated with navigation, such as piers, dams and access channels (Marques & Fonseca, 2010). There are two principal reasons for the adoption of the landlord port model in Nigeria. The first one is related to the need for funding. The Nigerian Port Authority as a public entity was not able to finance the operations alone. The second one concerns the neo-liberal thinking that have characterised the governments in Nigeria since the inception of the present democratic rule (left and right wings), that defend the minimum state intervention.
1.6.1 Nigerian seaports
Figure 1.1 shows the location of the six major Nigerian seaports under study. They are located in the southern part of the country. Two in Lagos State, Apapa and Tin Can and another two in Rivers State, Port Harcourt and Onne, while Warri and Calabar ports are in Delta and Cross River states respectively. Prior to concession, Nigeria had eight ultra- modern ports split into two zones for administrative purposes i.e. Western and Eastern zones under the control of the NPA. The Western zone consists of Apapa port, Container terminal port, Tin Can Island port, and a Roll on-Roll off (RORO) port. The Eastern zone comprises
of the Port Harcourt port complex, Delta port complex, Onne port complex, and the Calabar port complex. These eight ports constitute the primary port system, although there are smaller ports and oil terminals that operate under the ports‘ complexes. After the concession, the ports operate as six complexes: Lagos port complex, Tin Can Island port complex, Rivers port complex, Delta port complex, Onne port complex and Calabar port complex, each complex having ports under its jurisdiction.
Figure 1.1: Map of Nigeria showing location of seaports understudy
Source: Adapted from www.mapsofworld.com (2014)
Lagos Port Complex
The Lagos port complex is located at the Apapa area of Lagos and consists of Apapa port and a container terminal now called APM terminal; it occupies a land area of about 120 hectares. Apapa port has conventional berths that service all cargo types. These include 24 berths for handling dry cargo, two harbour berths for loading and discharging petroleum products. It also houses 13 transit sheds with a total storage space of 78,869 sq.metres and eight warehouses with a total space of 58,042 sq.metres and support facilities for cargo on transit to ECOWAS countries. The container terminal is inside of Apapa wharf and occupies an area of 44 hectares of land. The port terminal has six designated container berths, with a total quay length of 1km and a draught of 11.5m.
There are four terminal concessions carved out of Lagos port complex for four terminal operators; ABTL, ENL and GDNL from the former Apapa port, while the old container terminal is now APMT.
Tin Can Island Port Complex
Tin Can Island port complex is situated north-west of Apapa Wharf Lagos. It is a fusion of Tin Can Island port (TCIP) and the RORO port. The merger was as a result of the terminal concessions in 2006 and the port occupies an area of about 73 hectares of land that complement the RORO port. The TCIP port is comprised of the Kirikiri and Ikorodu lighter terminals and related jetties, in conjunction with a residential estate. The navigable channel has a width of 200m and a depth of 10.5m, with a total quay length of 2189m. It has berths for different cargoes, for example, berths 1 and 1A specialised in handling dry and bulk wheat cargo. The RORO port occupies berths 9 and 10, specially equipped to handle a large number of vehicles, containers and general cargo. The facilities in the RORO port include a car park with capacity for 7987 vehicles. A 435m quay length with a draught of 9.5m, two warehouses of 6800 sq.m each for containers and a stacking area of 22,86 sq.m with a capacity of 6017 tonnes.
There are four terminals and 1BOT terminal carved out of the Tin Can Island Port (TCIP) complex and operated by the following concessionaires; JOSD, FSL, PCHS, TICT and PTML, which is a BOT.
Delta Port Complex
The Delta port complex, in the Eastern zone, comprises of the following ports: Warri, Burutu, Koko and Sapele. It also includes the crude petroleum oil terminals of Escravos, Forcados and Pennington, located in the Delta region of Nigeria. The major port in this zone is the Warri Old and New port. The Warri port comprises of the Old and New Warri port. The Old port began operations in 1969, while the new port started in 1979 as an extension to the Old port. The port facilities available in Warri port include hard quays, jetties and mainstream buoys capable of handling 2.5m tonnes of bulk and break-bulk throughput. There are also 11 privately owned jetties. The depth of the approach channel varies between 6.4m-7m at high tide. The old port has a total quay length of 876m. It comprises of 8 berths, four of which are major berths, 3 are canal berths and one customs jetty, and Ogunu wharf dedicated to Ajaokuta iron and steel industries. The new Warri port comprises of 6 main berths, including one RORO berth, each with a length of 250m. The storage area of the old port consists of six transit sheds, warehouses. It is allocated to oil companies for storing their drilling equipments and warehouses ― A‖ and ―B‖ have capacities of 14,241 and 5,080 tonnes 1respectively. The new port has four transit sheds and two warehouses. Both ports have large stacking areas for outdoor cargo storage.
Other ports under the Delta port complex are Sapele, Burutu and Koko ports. The Delta port complex concession comprises of the following operators; Intels, AMS and Julius Berger.
Rivers Port Complex
The Rivers port complex, otherwise known as the Port Harcourt port, is the third largest port complex in Nigeria. The port was built in 1913 during the colonial period, to export coal and other cash crops from the eastern part of Nigeria to Europe. The complex comprises of Port Harcourt port; Okrika refined petroleum oil jetty, Haastrup/Eagle cement Jetty, Kidney Island Jetty, Ibeto Jetty and Macobar and Bitumen Jetties. It is a natural port comprising of eight berths and a quay length of 121kms. The average draught along the quay is 8.97m which can berth vessels of 15,000 tonnes deadweight.
1 1Tonne=1000Kilograms throughout this thesis
Port Harcourt port has two concessionaires, namely: Ports and terminal operators‘ limited (PTOL) and BUA ports and terminal limited (BUA). However, other services such as pilotage, towage, pollution and bathymetric surveys/ dredging of the channels are still the responsibility of the NPA.
Onne port Complex
Onne port started operation in 1982 under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement. In other words, it began operation abinitio as a landlord port. The Onne port is situated on the Bonny estuary on Ogu creek, which is 25kms from Port Harcourt. It covers a land area of 2,500 hectares. Onne port complex comprises of two main terminal facilities, i.e. Federal Ocean Terminal (FOT) and the Federal Lighter Terminal (FLT). The Port jurisdiction includes the Nigerian liquefied natural gas (NLNG) jetty, NAFCON now known as NOTORE jetty and the midstream discharge at Buoy 9.
In 1986, the Port was designated an oil and gas free zone by the Federal Government via Decree No. 8 of 1986. Presently, over 120 companies operate in the zone, and it is a hub of and oil gas operations and logistics in West and Central Africa. All the major oil companies maintain a presence at Onne port.
The FOT comprises of three berths with a quay length of 750m. The draught alongside the quay is 12m, and the channel is 11.5m, while the turning basin is 530 metres. The FLT has four berths and a total quay length of 1670 metres. Intels and Brawal operate the terminal. In 2010, another container terminal was carved out called West African Container Terminal (WACT) and located in the oil and gas free trade zone; it was concessioned to AP Moller Terminals. It has since commenced operation to cater for the greater Port Harcourt area and eastern Nigeria, including the local lucrative oil industry.
Calabar Port Complex
Calabar port is located 55 nautical miles from the Fairway buoy to the Calabar River, at latitude 4055‘N and longitude 8015.3‘E. The history of Calabar could be traced to the 15th century, as the pre-medieval merchants entered the eastern part of Nigeria for trade. Different shipping companies, such as M/S Palm Line Agencies limited, Elder Dempster Agencies, UAC and John Holts operated the port. The Federal Government of Nigeria took over the
operations of the port in 1969 and handed it over to the Nigerian ports authority, due to the inability of the private companies to provide adequate facilities for the functioning of the port. Thereafter the modernization of the port of Calabar was included in the 3rd national development plan of 1975-1980, to provide port facilities that will cope with the increasing demand of the domestic economy. The new Calabar port was commissioned in 1979.
The port comprises a land area of 38 hectares, with four quays measuring 215m long and 40m wide, and the channel width is 150m. The port has six operational berths, two warehouses measuring 150m x 40m and 175m x 40m. The operational area has been delineated into two terminals, A & B. Terminal A (2 berths) is allocated to Intels Nigeria Limited (Intels) and terminal B (4 berths) to Ecomarine terminals limited (ECM) and the Old port is a concession to Addax Nig. Limited.
Yearly Traffic Pattern and Trends of Nigerian Seaports
Table 1.1 shows the traffic growth pattern of Nigerian seaports for the period under study. The highest growth rate of 34.05% and 24.53% were observed between 2006 and 2007 for GRT and throughput respectively in the year terminal operations were transferred to the private operators. It is followed by a growth of rate of 26.27% and 24.22% for GRT and throughput respectively, achieved between 2000 and 2001. The period is both economically and politically remarkable in the annals of the country. It is the time that democratic rule returned to the country after a prolonged rule by the military, which restored confidence in the country by the international community. The new democratic administration increased wages by over 500%, which increased the purchasing power of many Nigerians. Nigeria being an import dependent country, this boosted trade and the flow of all types of imports to Nigeria. Almost all the imports pass through the ports; therefore, this increases traffic flow and the volume of cargo that passes through the ports.
Table 1.1 Gross registered tonnage (GRT) of vessels and throughput
Year GRT (tonnes) Annual percentage change in GRT Throughput (tonnes) Annual percentage change in throughput Number of vessels Annual percentage change in No. of vessels
2001 56,106,345 26.27 35,940,692 24.22 4473 9.44
2002 53,267,921 -5.06 36,987,241 2.91 4143 −7.37
2003 60,622,666 13.81 39,765,945 7.51 4315 4.15
2004 61,384,221 1.26 40,816,947 2.64 4553 5.51
2005 60,541,810 -1.37 44,952,078 10.13 4586 0.72
2006 63,267,047 4.50 46,150,518 2.67 4800 4.67
2007 84,806,792 34.05 57,473,350 24.53 4849 1.02
2008 89,505,702 5.54 64,372,749 12.00 4623 -4.66
2009 90,603,611 1.23 65,775,509 2.18 4721 2.12
2010 108,621,872 19.89 76,774,727 16.72 4881 3.39
2011 122,614,716 12.88 83,461,697 8.71 5232 7.19
The small percentage increase observed between 2008 and 2009 is due to the high level of congestion experienced at the Lagos ports. As terminal operators increased their capacity without a commensurate improvement in other related transport infrastructure, this gave rise to cargo build up at Apapa and TCIP. The congestion was so intense that the then NPA managing director, Oman Suleiman, suspended ship entrance into the Lagos ports from February to April 2009, to remove what was described as an ―alarming backlog‖. This affected the growth of traffic for the period. However, the increase in the number of ships that call at Nigeria is below 10 percent for the period. Although that throughput grew by 12% between 2007 and 2008, the number of ships that called at Nigerian ports decreased by - 4.66%. A cursory look at the GRT and the number of vessels shows a progressive increase in the size of ships that call at the ports from 2008-2011. For example, bigger container ships of 4,500 TEUs (WAFMAX) have started calling at Nigerian ports with the dredging of the Apapa channel and Bonny channel to a depth of 11.5metres. The structure of the remaining parts of the thesis is as follows:
Organisation of Thesis
ImageImageImageImageImageImageImageImageImageImageImageImageImageChapter 7 Discussion of Results/Policy Implications/Conclusion
Chapter 6 Role of Ownership on Nigerian Ports Performance
Chapter 5 Benchmarking Operational Efficiency of Nigerian Ports
Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology
Chapter 3 Performance Measurement
Chapter 2 Review of Theories, Concepts and Literature
Figure 1.2: Thesis structure
Chapter 2 examines the theoretical underpinnings surrounding privatisation, competition, regulation and their relationship to efficiency, with particular emphasis on the port industry. The literature on studies dealing with the outcome of privatisation as it relates to the port industry is explored, and the gap in the literature will be revealed in order to situate this research.
Chapter 3 aims to review the literature on performance measurements, with a focus on efficiency and productivity evaluation techniques. The chapter also evaluates the different efficiency and benchmarking approaches available in the port industry with particular emphasis on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist Productivity Index
(MPI). These will be the two methods employed in the analysis of the efficiency and productivity of Nigerian seaports.
Chapter 4 will describe the research design and strategy used to explore the influence of concession on the port industry in Nigeria. A number of analytical techniques, such as DEA and MPI, will be used in variable operationalisation. The survey design and analysis used to test the specific hypotheses will be explained. It elucidates the data collection methods and the criteria employed in this study.
Chapter 5 will utilise DEA variants of Inter-temporal, Contemporaneous and Window to analyse the efficiency of the ports for the 12 years under study and report on the results obtained. Also, the DEA-CCR (Variable returns to scale) with sets of panel data of six years (2000-2005 and 2006-2011) will be used to analyse the pre- and post-concession efficiency of the Nigerian seaports. The results obtained in the two analyses will be used to test the hypothesis. Equally, the chapter will explore the productivity change in the ports over the two periods by underpinning the sources of inefficiency.
Chapter 6 synthesises the findings of chapter 5 with competition and other exogenous factors to determine the role each plays in determining port operational performance. It is to assess the influence of ownership on efficiency and to model the performance of Nigerian seaports.
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the summary of the key findings and draws conclusions based on the results obtained from the various analyses. It also highlights the policy and managerial implications of the study, based on the findings. In addition, recommendations will be proffered based on the outcomes of the research. This chapter brings out the limitations of the study and the areas of focus for future research..